We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.
Introduction
We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. 1 A number of allocation rules, including several forms of auction, are proposed for various social purposes such as efficiency, revenue maximization, etc. For the purpose of efficiency, one rule has a remarkable feature. It is "the Vickrey allocation rule". First, the Vickrey allocation rule allocates the goods to agents evaluating the good highest. ("Efficiency") Second, the Vickrey allocation rule extracts true information on agents' valuations from them. ("Strategy-Proofness") Thirdly, the Vickrey allocation rule induces agents' voluntary participation. ("Individual Rationality") And most importantly, as proved by Holmstrom (1979) , the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying these three properties. It is well known that the Vickrey allocation rule also satisfies a property of impartiality called "anonymity". In this paper, we characterize the Vickrey allocation rule by focusing on anonymity instead of efficiency. Our characterization emphasizes that the Vickrey allocation rule also has a remarkable feature for the purpose of impartiality.
An allocation rule is generally formulated as a function from the set of agents' valuations on the good to the feasible set. An allocation rule is efficient if it allocates the goods to agents evaluating the good highest. Given an allocation rule, since agents' private valuations are not known to the others, there may be incentives for agents to misrepresent their values in order to manipulate the final outcomes to their favor. As a result, the actual outcomes may not constitute a socially desirable allocation relative to agents' true valuations. Therefore, allocation rules need to be immune to such strategic misrepresentation in order to securely attain a desirable allocation for agents' true valuations. If an allocation rule is immune to such strategic behavior, that is, if it is a dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true valuations, then the allocation rule is said to be strategy-proof. A condition of individual rationality is also imposed on allocation rules to induce agents' voluntary participation; it says that an allocation rule never assigns an allocation which makes some agent worse off than he would be if he receives no good and pays nothing. It is important to know what allocation rules satisfy efficiency, strategyproofness, and individual rationality. The Vickrey allocation rule is the rule such that agents with m highest valuations of the goods receive the goods and pay the (m + 1)-th valuation, and other agents pay nothing. Holmstrom (1979) 2 establishes that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. This result emphasizes the distinguished importance of the Vickrey allocation rule for the purpose of efficiency.
However, society members are often more sensitive to impartiality than efficiency. In such environments, governments need to make more of impartiality than efficiency. Anonymity is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own values 1 The vehicle ownership licence in Singapore is also an example, where the ownership licences are distributed among residents through auction. 2 Similar characterizations of Groves rules in public good models are previously established by Green and Laffont (1977) , and Walker (1978) . However, the characterizations of the these two articles cannot be applied to allocation rules of indivisible goods since they assume that the class of admissible preferences include preferences which are not admissible in the model of indivisible goods allocation. or identities. An allocation rule is anonymous if when the valuations of two agents are switched, their net gain under the rule are also switched. In this article, we establish that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and individual rationality. (Theorem 2) There is also literature analyzing the fairness of the Vickrey allocation rule. Most of such literature focus on "envy-freeness." An allocation rule is envy-free if no agent prefers another agent's allocation to his own. Svensson (1983) shows that envy-freeness of indivisible goods allocation implies efficiency. This result, together with Holmstrom's (1979) , implies that the Vickrey allocation rule is also the unique rule satisfying strategyproofness, envy-freeness, and individual rationality. Many authors such as Papai (2003) , Ohseto (2005) , Sakai (2005) , etc., apply Svensson's (1983) result to characterize the Vickrey allocation rule.
In this article, we do not impose envy-freeness on allocation rules, and so we cannot apply Svensson's (1983) result. Instead, we show that strategy-proofness, anonymity, and individual rationality together imply efficiency (Proposition). This result, together with Holmstrom's (1979), implies our characterization of the Vickrey allocation rule (Theorem 2). Focusing on anonymity, our characterization emphasizes that the Vickrey allocation rule also has a remarkable feature for the purpose of impartiality, and complements Holmstrom's (1979) . Section 2 sets up the model, defines basic notions, and states main results. Section 3 provides the proof of Proposition.
Section 2 Model and Main Result
The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , N}. There are m units of an indivisible good. An item allocation is a n−tuple x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that P x i = m, where for each i ∈ N, x i is the units of the good agent i receives. 3 We assume that x i = 0 or x i = 1 for each i ∈ N, that is, agents can receive at most one unit of the good. Denote the set of item allocations by X, that is, X = {x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n : P x i = m}. For each i ∈ N, denote agent i's payment by p i ∈ R + . We assume that payments are nonnegative. The feasible set is Z = X ×R n + . An allocation is an element z = (x, p) = (x 1 , . . . , x n ; p 1 , . . . , p n ) of Z, and agent i's allocation is z i = (x i , p i ).
Each agent i ∈ N has a quasi-linear utility function
denotes the value profile generated from v by replacing the values of the set N 0 of agents by b v N 0 . An allocation rule is a function f from V to Z. Given an allocation rule f and a value profile v ∈ V , we denote
. . , p n (v)) respectively denote the outcome item allocation and payments of f for v, and we also denote
We introduce several conditions of allocation rules. The first one is "efficiency". It says that allocation rules maximize the total value.
Next, we introduce impartiality conditions. "Equal treatment of equals" says that allocation rules give equal utility levels to agents with the same value. "Anonymity" says that when the valuations of two agents are switched, their utility levels are also switched. This condition requires rules to treat agents equally from the viewpoints of agents who are ignorant of their own values or identities.
Definition: An allocation rule f equally treats equals if for all v ∈ V ,
where
Anonymity implies equal treatment of equals. 4 "Envy-freeness" says that no agent prefers another agent's allocation to his own. In contrast to anonymity, this condition compares agents' welfare from the viewpoints of agents whose identifies and values are specified.
Definition: An allocation rule f is envy-free if for all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N and all j ∈ N,
"Strategy-proofness" is one of strongest incentive compatibility conditions. It says that to announce one's true value is a dominant strategy.
Definition: An allocation rule f is strategy-proof if for all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N, and all
"Individual rationality" induces agents to participate voluntarily by guaranteeing that an allocation rule never assigns the outcome that makes some agent worse off than his status quo u i (0, 0) = 0.
Given a value profile v ∈ V , we rank agents' values, and denote the agent with the first highest value by i(v, 1), the agent with the second highest value by i(v, 2), and so on. Ties are broken arbitrarily. Under the Vickrey allocation rule defined below, agents with m highest values receive the goods and pay the (m + 1)−th highest value, v i(v,m+1) , and other agents pay nothing. 
for any u ∈ U and any i ∈ N.
Theorem 1 below says that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality.
Theorem 1 (Holmstrom, 1979) : An allocation rule satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality if and only if it is the Vickrey allocation rule.
Proposition below says that the condition of anonymity, together with strategy-proofness and individual rationality, implies efficiency. We prove Proposition in Section 3.
Proposition: If an allocation rule satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality, it also satisfies efficiency.
As Svensson (1983) shows, envy-freeness alone implies efficiency. However, as Example 1 illustrates, anonymity alone does not imply efficiency.
Example 1: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if
. Then, f is anonymous, but not efficient. f also violates strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.
It is well known that the Vickrey allocation rule satisfies the three axioms of strategyproofness, anonymity and individual rationality. Thus, Theorem 1 and Proposition together imply Theorem 2 below. Theorem 2 says that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and individual rationality.
Theorem 2: An allocation rule satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality if and only if it is the Vickrey allocation rule.
The three examples below illustrate that the three axioms in the Theorem 2 are all indispensable.
Example 2: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if v 1 ≥ 1, f (v) = (1, 0; 1, 0), and if v 1 < 1, f (v) = (0, 1; 0, 0). Then, f satisfies strategy-proofness, and individual rationality, but not anonymity. f is not the Vickrey allocation rule.
Example 3: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if
. Then, f satisfies anonymity, and individual rationality, but not strategy-proofness. f is not the Vickrey allocation rule.
Example 4: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if v 1 ≥ v 2 , f (v) = (1, 0; 2v 2 , v 1 ), and if v 1 < v 2 , f (v) = (0, 1; v 2 , 2v 1 ). Then, f satisfies strategyproofness, and anonymity, but not individual rationality. f is not the Vickrey allocation rule.
Section 3 Proofs
We devote this section to the proof of Proposition.
Lemmas
In this subsection, we state and prove several lemmas as preliminary results for the proof of Proposition.
Lemma 1: Let f be an individually rational allocation rule. For all v ∈ V and all i ∈ N, if x i (v) = 0, then p i (v) = 0 and u i (f i (v)) = 0.
Lemma 1 directly follows from individual rationality. Thus, we omit the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: Let f be a strategy-proof allocation rule. For all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N, and all
Proof: Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N, and b
. This is a contradiction to strategy-proofness. Therefore,
, and by Lemma 2,
Lemma 4: Let f be a strategy-proof and individually rational allocation rule. For all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N, and all
Proof: Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N, and b v i ∈ V i be such that x i (v) = 0 and b
. This is a contradiction to strategy-proofness. Therefore, x i (b v i , v −i ) = 0, and by Lemma 1,
Let f be a strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational allocation
Proof: By Lemma 3,
Let f be a strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational allocation 
Proof of Proposition
In this subsection, we prove Proposition. Let f be an allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality. Let v ∈ V . We show that f (v) is efficient. Without loss of generality, assume 
Since there are only m units of the goods, it follows that there is agent i 0 < m such that
We repeat this procedure until we get a contradiction. To prove Condition (B), we also repeat a similar procedure. During the repetitions, Claim below holds. (N 1 ∪N 2 ∪N 3 ∪N 4 ) ), the value profile generated from v by lowering the values of N 1 to v m and raising those of N 4 to v m . 6 If there is i ∈ N 2 such that v i > v m and 6 In case of N 1 = {1, . . . , l}, N 2 = {l + 1, . . . , m − 1}, and N 4 = {n 0 + 1, . . . , n 0 + l},
and (iv) there is j ∈ N 2 such that for b v j = v m , and for all k ∈ N 1 ∪ N 3 ∪ N 4 ∪ {i, j},
Proof of Claim: Assume that there is i ∈ N 2 such that v i > v m and 
) is less than or equal to (m−1) −l −1 = m− l −2. Thus, since there are m units of the good, there is j ∈ N\(
Similarly, Conclusion (iii) follows from Lemma 5, and Conclusion (iv) follows from Conclusion (iii) and Lemma 6 . 
. . , n 0 }. Since there are only m units of the good, there is i 0 ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}\{i} such that
Thus, v i 0 > v m and we can apply Conclusion (ii) of Claim again. Apply Conclusion (ii) of Claim (n − n 0 ) times in this way. As a result, we have:
= N, and so we have already a
) is the value profile such that (N 1 ∪N 4 ) ) is the value profile such that
).
contradiction. Thus, m − 1 > n − n 0 . Since n > n 0 and there are only m units of the good, there is k ∈ N\( 
Case 2-A-2: m − 1 < n − n 0 . Similarly to Case 2-A-1, apply Conclusion (ii) of Claim (m − 1) times. As a result, we have:
. . , v m ). 8 Since there are only m units of the good and m ≥ 2, this is a contradiction.
Since we get a contradiction whether m − 1 ≥ n − n 0 or m − 1 < n − n 0 , Condition (A) holds.
Proof of Condition (B): Suppose that there is i ∈ N such that x i (v) = 1 and i ∈ {n 0 + 1, . . . , n}. We derive a contradiction. By i > n 0 , v i < v m . If m = 1, then by applying Conclusion (i) of Claim, we derive a contradiction. For Conclusion (i) of Claim implies that for all j ∈ {m, . . . , n 0 } ∪ {i},
Case 2 Since we get a contradiction whether m − 1 ≥ n − n 0 or m − 1 < n − n 0 , Condition (B) holds.
Since Conditions (A) and (B) both hold, f (v) is efficient. We have completed the proof of Proposition.
